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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how both the Army as an organization and its small unit leaders
attempted to maintain the soldiers’ morale in the European Theater of Operations during World
War II. Morale was critical to the Allied victory in the war, yet the morale of frontline GIs was
often neglected. This occurred with such frequency that many combat soldiers suffered from a
new category of wound known as “combat exhaustion.” Through an examination of what
influenced combat soldiers’ morale, a clearer understanding of what the Army did well and how
it failed to support combat GIs emerges, as does an explanation for why combat exhaustion
caused so many casualties during the European campaign. This link between morale
maintenance and combat exhaustion was critical to the efficiency of combat units during the war
and ultimately helped determine the shape and outcome of every battle.
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AUTHOR’S NOTE

This paper is situated within the context of the US Army during World War II, a period
and experience with which many readers may be unfamiliar. It was challenging to write about
the soldiers experiences because their world was very different from modern life. In order to
understand much of the analysis, a substantial amount of background information is required. As
much as possible, I have tried to integrate this information into the body of the text or include it
in the footnotes. Also available for reference is a glossary of acronyms and terms that may be
unfamiliar to the average reader, but were common in military parlance of the time. Finally, I
have included a breakdown of the basic units that comprised an US Army infantry division
during World War II below.
Structure of US Army Infantry Division
Squads (usually nine to twelve men)
Three squads to a platoon
Three or four platoons to a company
Three or four companies to a battalion
Three or four battalions to a regiment
Three or four regiments to a division
Plus attached engineers, artillery, medical, and other support personnel.
An infantry division totaled about 15,000 men at full strength, but after entering combat a
division was rarely at full strength due to the casualties it sustained. These casualties
sometimes necessitated the reorganization or consolidation of units which accounts for
the approximations above.1

1

Stephen Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of WWII (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1995), 12. After heavy combat it was not unusual for companies to only have enough men for one or two platoons
which meant that unit designations were not always accurate descriptions of real unit strength. Sergeant Raymond
Gantter recorded in his journal on January 31, 1945 that “After two days of pushing, the company now consisted of
forty-seven men. Three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon—total, forty-seven men. There were twenty-nine men
in the three rifle platoons. Not all of our losses were from enemy action, however: there were many casualties from
illness, particularly trenchfoot and frostbite.” Raymond Gantter, Roll Me Over: An Infantryman’s World War II
(New York: Ivy Books, 1997), 137.
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Figure 1: Rifle Company Table of Organization

Source: Rush, GI, 27.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Army overcame many challenges in the Second World War, but one
challenge it failed to anticipate was the importance morale maintenance would play in a long,
drawn-out conflict. After the initial fervor and surge of patriotism wore off, “‘high morale’
became a substitute for all sorts of lost, valuable things—the critical spirit, for example, or even,
as John Knowles says, happiness itself, which ‘had disappeared along with rubber, silk and many
other staples, to be replaced by the wartime synthetic, high morale, for the duration.’”2 Despite
its importance, the Army struggled at times to maintain high morale levels where it was most
critical: the frontlines, where the war was actually being fought by squads and platoons of GIs. 3
To the frontline soldier, every day was a struggle to survive the deadly frontline conditions and
high morale was often vital to his performance and survival. The fulfillment of a basic human
need could make the difference between surviving another night in sub-freezing conditions in a
foxhole during the Battle of the Bulge and reaching one’s “breaking point,” thus becoming a
combat exhaustion casualty.4 This paper investigates what caused soldiers’ morale levels as well
as examine whether or not the Army and its small unit leaders were able to control any of these
influences.5 It also touches upon what was a new classification of casualty for the US Army,
“combat exhaustion,” and explore how this was the ultimate failure of morale.
During World War II, the Army was engaged in operations around the world. This paper
however, focuses specifically on the Army in European Theater of Operations (ETO). Since
2

Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 144.
3
See Glossary.
4
See Glossary.
5
For the purposes of this paper, small unit leaders refers to the captains, lieutenants and sergeants that led
companies, platoons and squads in frontline ground combat units. See also the Author’s note for an explanation of
Army organizational structure.

1
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environmental factors had such a significant impact on morale, analyzing all theaters, with all of
their various climates, would be a substantially larger project than could be completed here.
Focusing on the ETO also allows for a narrowing of the primary time frame investigated to
1944-1945 because combat operations did not begin until the invasion of Normandy, France on
June 6, 1944. In order to understand morale maintenance, a definition what morale meant to the
Army during World War II, why it was important and how it was tracked is established in the
first section. Following that is an examination of what affected soldiers’ morale and how the
Army or small unit leaders influenced these causes of soldiers’ morale to either improve morale
or unintentionally lower soldier’s morale. Lastly, the high incidence of combat exhaustion
casualties in the ETO and their relationship to soldiers’ morale levels are considered
Morale is often a factor in discussions on the American soldier’s experience in World
War II. In memoirs, veterans often document how they felt during the war and describe what was
most important to them while engaged in combat. These same elements can also be ascertained
through careful analysis of period Army reports from the various ETO Army commands.
Additionally, war correspondent Ernie Pyle attempted to convey the soldier’s experience to his
readers during the war through his numerous dispatches about frontline life. The Army’s
Research Branch even conducted a series of studies called the Soldier Surveys which specifically
asked soldiers for their opinions on a wide variety of issues during the war.6 Samuel Stouffer and

6

The Research Branch, tasked with studying the attitudes of America’s citizen soldiers, was the first
organization of its kind. The Research Branch was formed in October, 1941 as part of the Army’s Information and
Education Division and was comprised of psychology, sociology and statistical analysis experts who used the most
modern social science methods available. Its job was to conduct systematic and scientific research projects and
investigations on the thoughts, opinions and beliefs of US soldiers. It was noted that when being surveyed, soldiers
took their task seriously as demonstrated by the “painstaking detail” with which they wrote out free-response
answers. The purpose of this was to provide commanders with useful and accurate information from which they
could make decisions. The Research Branch produced more than 300 of these surveys during the war and questioned
more than half a million soldiers. These sources are some of the most useful, comprehensive and respected ones in
the field. Samuel Stouffer et al, Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press
1949), 1:Ch. 1.
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other social psychologists who conducted the surveys during the war returned to these surveys
after the war and thoroughly reanalyzed them in the multi-volume work Studies in Social
Psychology in World War II. Several historians including Charles B. MacDonald, Paul Fussell,
S.L.A. Marshall, Michael Doubler and John McManus have also touched on morale from various
angles in their work. All of the above sources acknowledge that soldiers’ morale was an
important factor during World War II but, no one has yet investigated what caused soldiers’
morale levels and the connection to combat exhaustion. All of the scattered descriptions and
analysis of morale is brought together here, in order to examine all of the causes for combat
soldiers’ morale levels and how the Army and small unit leaders attempted to influence these
factors.

SECTION 1: UNDERSTANDING MORALE

What is Morale
In order to maintain morale or even asses it, one must first define it. The concept of
morale is often understood inherently in conversation, but its intangibility makes it difficult to
define concretely or express in words. Nevertheless, this essay requires an examination of the
definition of morale in order to assess how it affected GIs in and how its maintenance was
approached by the Army during World War II. To better appreciate what is meant by morale,
several definitions from historians, a journalist and official Army publications are examined.
While all of these struggle to precisely define morale in its entirety as individuals, using them
collectively, allows for a thorough understanding of the expansive scope and significance the
term morale encompassed.
In 1944, the US Army Service Forces (ASF) published manual M207: Building Morale in
the ASF which was designed to help leaders address the issue of morale in their units.7 Archival
research has not yielded an equivalent manual on morale published by the Army Ground Forces
(AGF) that would apply specifically to ground combat units. Such a manual would be ideal, but
history has left only the ASF manual. M207 can still be quite useful though because Army
doctrine is passed down the chain of command starting at the top with the Department of the
Army to subordinate commands like the ASF and AGF. Therefore, official positions on morale
would have been in agreement between the ASF and AGF because they were both subordinate
commands. Thus, the assumption is that the official commentary on morale in M207 is also valid
7

Army Service Forces refers to the branches of the US Army (e.g. Quartermaster, Transportation, and
Ordnance) that provided logistic and infrastructure support for Army operations. These branches were not generally
engaged in combat under normal wartime circumstances. Army Service Forces Manual M207: Building Morale in
the ASF, 8 August 1944, box 1011, Record Group 330, Research Division Surveys on Troop Attitudes 1942 - Jun
1955: Miscellaneous Reports-Unnumbered, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

4

5
and applicable to the AGF. This assumption is reinforced with the quoting of General George C.
Marshall, the Army’s Chief of Staff in the section of M207 titled “What is Morale?” As the Chief
of Staff, General Marshall was the highest ranking officer in the Army during World War II and
therefore, his position on a subject like morale would have influenced on the position adopted by
the entire Army, including the ASF and the AGF.
In manual M207, the ASF attempts to zero-in on a definition of morale by offering
several different definitions from prominent Army commanders. The Adjutant General of the
Army, Major General Ulio, highlighted the qualities of pride and confidence in his definition of
morale. Civil War General Sheridan equated morale with the soldiers’ level of absolute
confidence. Both of these definitions, however, are rather over simplified, for if morale is really
just pride and confidence, then why does the term morale even exist? The very fact that morale is
important enough for the Army write a whole manual on it indicates that it was a fairly complex
subject composed of more elements than just pride and confidence. Below are General
Marshall’s thoughts on morale’s definition:
First in importance will be the development of high morale and the
building of sound discipline, based on wise leadership and a spirit of mutual
cooperation throughout all ranks. Morale, engendered by thoughtful consideration
of officers and enlisted men by their commanders, will produce a cheerful and
understanding subordination of the individual to the good of the team. This is the
essence of the American Standard of discipline, and it is a primary responsibility
of leaders to develop and maintain such a standard.8
While the manual presents this as General Marshall’s definition of morale, he only talks about it
in a tangential way. This is most unhelpful because he does not aid in deconstructing the
complexities of the term. Then, instead of synthesizing these three definitions into one clear and

8

Ibid., 2A-1-2.
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concise definition, the manual moves on to the next section which lists the four components of
morale as zeal, discipline, self-confidence, and satisfaction.9
The chapter in M207 closes with the acknowledgment that “there are many definitions of
morale, covering everything from the belief in why one fights to satisfaction with one’s mess.10
No single definition can cover all the elements that constitute morale.”11 This admission reveals
the Army’s overarching philosophy towards morale maintenance during World War II. In place
of monitoring and regulating morale from the highest command echelons, the Army recognized
the importance of morale in battlefield success and trained its junior leaders to understand this
and manage it at the lowest level possible. Thus, the responsibility to maintain morale in ground
combat units fell to the NCOs and company grade officers. Only in cases where the extremely
poor condition of morale necessitates action did higher commands get involved in directing
trying to manage individual soldiers’ morale. For example, in the Normandy campaign higher
headquarters had to react to the growing number of combat exhaustion cases which were
draining the manpower of combat units.
The next two sources who addressed the definition of morale are war correspondent Ernie
Pyle and historian Paul Fussell. Both were extremely close to the Army in World War II and
understood it intimately. This allows them a special privilege to write about how morale was
understood in the Army during the war. They do not have the official authority of M207, but
provide valuable commentary on morale’s definition.
Pyle was a highly respected journalist during the war whose dispatches were widely
published and read. He was also beloved by GIs for his truthful and accurate descriptions of
frontline life in his dispatches. Pyle spent most of his time attached to frontline troops and while
9

Ibid., 2A-2.
See Glossary.
11
Ibid., 2D-1.
10
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he was technically a noncombatant, he had extensive experience with ground combat units.12 As
a result, he could honestly claim, “I’ve been around war long enough to know that nine-tenths of
morale is pride in your outfit and confidence in your leaders and fellow fighters.”13 In this case,
the statements on morale from M207 are corroborated, but Pyle does not dance around his
definition. Pyle also explicitly states what morale is not:
A lot of people have morale confused with the desire to fight. I don’t
know of one soldier out of ten thousand who wants to fight. They certainly didn’t
in that company. The old-timers were sick to death of battle, and the new
replacements were scared to death of it. And yet the company went on into battle,
and it was a proud company.14
This is an important distinction Pyle makes because it describes the mental state of GIs in
combat, which in turn affected their morale and influenced what the Army could do to attempt to
maintain high soldier morale.
The second source presented here is the view of historian Paul Fussell. Fussell is an
important World War II historian because he was actually an Army Infantry officer during the
European campaign in World War II. This means he had first-hand experience with morale in
ground combat units. Fussell presents the transformation of morale’s definition during the war
from simple to complex as evidence of the concept of morale’s growth and development during
the war. He argues that the prewar definition was much simpler and straightforward, whereas the
postwar definition is much more complete as a result of morale’s significant influence during the
12

A note on Pyle: Pyle was a Pulitzer Prize winner and reported on many theaters of the war, starting with
the North African campaign in 1942 and continuing through the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. He then covered the
D-Day landings and remained in the ETO until September 1944. Pyle’s dispatches were purposely written in a
generic form which caused many soldiers fighting around the world to be able to relate to the experiences he
detailed. Because he wrote about universal experiences and emotions that could transcend specific dates and
locations during the war, his work has been cited often in this essay. However, care has been taken in selection of
the quoted passages to ensure that they are relevant and appropriate to the topic in question. Symbolic of his
dedication to telling the story of the frontline soldier, Pyle was killed in 1945 while reporting on the frontlines
during the battle for Okinawa.
13
Ernie Pyle, Brave Men (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1944), 194.
14
Ibid.
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war. Further he claims that, “…raising and sustaining morale became all-important, and morale
itself developed into one of the unique obsessions of the Allies in the Second World War.” The
resultant definition, molded by the war and accepted by Fussel is:
Morale: Prevailing mood and spirit, conducive to willing and dependable
performance, steady self-control, and courageous, determined conduct despite danger and
privations, based upon a conviction of being in the right and on the way to success and
upon faith in the cause or program and in the leadership, usually connoting, esp. when
qualified by the adjective high, a confident aggressive, resolute, often buoyant, spirit of
wholehearted co-operation in a common effort, often attended particularly by zeal, selfsacrifice, or indomitableness.15
This definition best illustrates the complexity of the morale issue during World War II. It
encompassed many different aspects of a soldier’s spirit and was applicable in a wide variety of
situations. Fussell’s definition provides a more encompassing perspective on morale from which
this paper can investigate the full scope of morale’s causes and influences. This is not to say that
pride and confidence are not important to morale. That they are important is proposed by the
Army and confirmed by Pyle. It is through the synthesis of all of these definitions that the
investigation and analysis of morale maintenance in the Army during World War II will be most
effective and complete.
The problem of morale’s definition arises from the fact that unlike this paper, the Army
failed to pursue a definition that encompassed more than pride and confidence. This limited
definition of morale then made it difficult to identify the wide variety of causes of soldiers’
morale levels. The lack of a thorough definition prevented the Army from effectively
maintaining soldiers’ morale levels throughout the war; a fault which ultimately produced
casualties and reduced the Army’s combat effectiveness.

15

Fussell, Wartime, 144.
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The Importance of Morale
Despite its lack of a thorough definition, the importance of morale was not undersold by
the Army during the war. M207 admonishes its audience, Army officers, from the beginning that
“Morale may seem like a little thing, too, yet it determines the shape of battles and the fate of
nations.”16 Morale was a vital component to every military operation. High morale was regarded
as almost essential to success and low morale as a possible grounds for failure, which in a
military context, could be catastrophic. Low morale was always a cause for concern by
commanders. The good news for commanders was that, “Good morale mean[t] better
performance: How well a man perform[ed] his job [was] affected by the state of his morale.”17
M207 provides a good example of how in an Engineer regiment, building the Alaska Highway in
unforgiving conditions, had their morale buoyed through a simple organized hunt to obtain meat
for their mess. This act encouraged the men in the completion of a vital defensive logistical route
between the continental US and Alaska.
Not surprisingly, there are more recorded cases of low morale and its negative effects
than of high morale’s positive ones. This is partially because officers were expected to build
morale and maintain a positive atmosphere in their units. High morale was just another
component necessary for mission success and only the absence of high morale or a failed
mission were likely to attract special attention. Pyle recorded just such an incident that would
have been a warning sign of low morale to this unit’s leadership:
The soldiers [Infantrymen from the 9th Division] around us had a two
weeks’ growth of beard. Their uniforms were worn slick and very dirty—the
uncomfortable gas impregnated clothes they had come ashore in. The boys were
tired. They had been fighting and moving constantly forward on foot for nearly
three weeks without rest—sleeping out on the ground, wet most of the time,
16
17

Building Morale in the ASF, 1A-3.
Ibid., 2D-1.
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always tense, eating cold rations, seeing their friends die. One of them came up to
me and said, almost belligerently, ‘Why don’t you tell the folks back home what
this is like? All they hear about is victories and a lot of glory stuff. They don’t
know that for every hundred yards we advance somebody gets killed. Why don’t
you tell them how tough this life is?’ I told him that was what I tried to do all the
time. This fellow was pretty fed up with it all. He said he didn’t see why his outfit
wasn’t sent home; they had done all the fighting. That wasn’t true at all, for there
were other divisions that had fought more and taken heavier casualties.
Exhaustion will make a man feel like that. A few days’ rest usually has him
smiling again.”18
In this dispatch, Pyle has encountered a veteran combat soldier who has had enough of combat.
This negative attitude was common among veteran combat soldiers. The soldier described was
not brimming with pride or confidence and was vocalizing the low status of his morale. For a
leader, this could pose a dangerous problem should this soldier chose to disobey orders and
jeopardize the mission or other soldiers’ lives, although it was unlikely he would willfully
endanger his comrades. The more likely outcome, if the soldier did not receive the needed rest
Pyle mentions, was that this soldier would break under the continued stress of frontline combat.
This soldier would then become a combat exhaustion casualty and require evacuation from the
frontline.
Pyle also provides a contrasting situation. While in similarly terrible frontline conditions,
he remarked, “the thing that always amazed me about those inhumane night movements of
troops in war areas was how good-natured the men were about it. A certain fundamental
appreciation of the ridiculousness carried them through. As we slogged along, slipping and
crawling and getting muddier and muddier, the soldier behind me said, ‘I’m going to write my
congressman about this.’”19 This passage illustrates the critical point that just because the
situation was dangerous and the soldiers were miserable, there was not an automatic
18
19

Pyle, Brave Men, 424-25.
Pyle, Brave Men, 213.
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deterioration of morale levels. High morale could be maintained in even the worst conditions.
Additionally, the American GI was quite resilient and took a lot of punishment. While there were
certainly a wide range of factors that had an effect on morale, which the next chapter will
investigate, opportunities existed for high morale even in the brutal combat faced by the Army’s
Ground Forces in Europe.
Tracking Morale
The simplest explanation for why morale was not tracked army-wide is because it was
too complicated and impractical to develop and implement a system which could have accurately
evaluated such an expansive and dynamic concept as morale in ground combat units on the
frontlines. It presumably would have required a huge amount of manpower to investigate morale
levels for all of the units in an army millions strong. Additionally, it would have been impractical
to assess the morale of soldiers and units stationed in remote areas around the world and as well
as those engaged in combat. Moreover, by the time an investigation had been finished and a
report was submitted, the tactical situation on the ground would most likely have changed, thus
affecting morale levels and rendering the report obsolete. The Army had many pressing concerns
during the war, all of which demanded manpower and resources and the Army appears to have
chosen not to devote resources to comprehensive, Army wide morale tracking program.
The alternative solution adopted by the Army was to place responsibility for morale
maintenance as far down the chain of command as possible (as was implied by M207). This
meant that morale maintenance became the responsibility of small unit leaders at the squad,
platoon and company levels. This approach eliminated the geographical, logistical and
manpower problems that would have been posed by an army-wide morale tracking program.
With this system, only major morale problems made their way up the chain of command. For

12
example, the 101st Airborne Division training in England prior to D-Day experienced a severe
case of low morale due to a lack of confidence in the company commander among the members
of E Company, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Confidence was so low that the NCOs of the
company took drastic action to get the commander replaced before the invasion took place. All
but a couple of the NCOs wrote a letter to the regimental commander stating that they no longer
wished to serve as an NCO in E Company and were turning I their “stripes.”20 This action
amounted to munity for which they all “could be shot.” Luckily, none were, the company
commander was replaced, and morale improved immediately, but this was the type of extreme
situation which necessitated the involvement of more senior commanders, in this case the
regimental commander.21
Junior officers were responsible for maintaining the morale of the soldiers under their
command. In order to maintain morale though, officers first needed a mechanism by which to
evaluate morale levels in their unit M207 provides this guidance:
An officer can keep himself informed of the morale in his outfit by
observing their attitudes and their performance. Morale attitudes are evidenced by
the expression of certain opinions on the part of troops. While the officer may not
conduct formal morale surveys among his men, he can watch for expressions of
attitudes which indicate low morale. Performance indicative of low morale is
readily perceived by the sensitive officer. Some of the many indicators are:22

20

NCO ranks were denoted on their uniforms by a series of chevrons on their upper sleeves and were often
referred to as “stripes.”
21
Stephen Ambrose, Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to
Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 52.
22
Building Morale in the ASF, 2D-1-2.
* This information is presented in list form in the original source, but has been reformatted here for the
reader’s convenience.
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Figure 2: ASF Indicators of Low Morale*
Excessive AWOL or desertion
cases.
High venereal disease rate.
Large number of transfer
requests.
Large number of malingerers.

Excessive amount of company
punishment.
Large number of courts martial.
Carelessness in dress, saluting,
etc.
Slow response to commands.

Inattention during training
sessions.
Large number of troop quarrels.
Carelessness with military
equipment.
High sick rate.

Source: Building Morale in the ASF, 2D-1-2

This guidance from M207 was geared more towards garrison environments or areas away
from combat zones, but it is useful in that it illustrates how officers were supposed to approach
morale maintenance. Officers were trained to be cognizant of morale levels and to deal with a
wide variety of situations they might encounter with their units through critical thinking and
problem solving. They were not given formulaic instructions on how to react to very specific
situations because it was impossible to train for every possible scenario an officer might
encounter. This training program kept with the Army’s methodology of dealing with morale at
the small unit level unless a special circumstance required a more senior level of involvement.
The Army’s failure to understand fully how expansive of a concept morale was inhibited
its ability to maintain combat soldiers’ morale during World War II. The choice to place the
responsibility for morale maintenance on small unit leaders, affected soldiers’ morale levels
because it determined what causes could and could not be manipulated in the soldiers’ favor by
either the Army or the small unit leaders. This had major implications for soldiers’ and units’
combat effectiveness because morale was so critical importance to battlefield success.
Unfortunately, morale would prove to pose significant problems for the Army in the ETO from
1944 to 1945.

SECTION 2: CAUSES OF SOLDIERS’ MORALE LEVELS

With morale being such a complex concept, it is no surprise that there were a multitude
of influences on soldiers’ morale levels in the ETO. These influences have been broken down
into four distinct categories within this chapter which are: Pride, Credit and Camaraderie,
Necessities of Combat, Tactical Concerns and Escape from the Frontlines. Each of these
categories deals with related sub-issues all of which affected GIs’ morale. This chapter examines
how each of these elements influenced morale and how both the Army as an organization and
small unit leaders were able to manipulate these elements while attempting to improve soldiers’
overall morale while simultaneously maintaining combat effectiveness of units and individuals.
This figure below is a visual guide to understanding the interplay between the influences
on soldiers’ morale. This map demonstrates how a multitude of influences converged to
collectively affect soldiers’ morale. While many of these elements are closely connected, they
have been divided here into the four distinct categories mentioned above. The purpose for these
divisions is to make the complex concept of morale easier to analyze methodically. The visual
representation also demonstrates how many different facets morale encompassed during World
War II.

14
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Figure 3: Influences on Soldiers’ Morale

Pride, Credit and Camaraderie
The level of pride soldiers’ had in their outfit; whether or not a unit was receiving credit
for its actions, contributions, and achievements in combat; and the atmosphere of camaraderie
present within a unit were all important and constant influences on GIs’ morale levels while they
were in combat.23 These factors are special in that they tended to affect the morale of a unit as a
whole instead of individual soldiers. Therefore they had a great influence on a unit’s overall
combat effectiveness as opposed to influences that affected soldiers on an individual level. Of
note here is the use of the more generic term unit in place of specifying a particular size of unit
23

Outfit was GI slang for unit.
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such as a company or a division because these factors can function at multiple organizational
levels simultaneously.
Pride played a prominent role in soldiers’ morale. In the following case recorded by Pyle,
the company’s pride in itself promoted high morale was critical to their combat effectiveness and
their repeated high performance in combat. Pyle observed, “I’ve never seen a man prouder of his
company than Lieutenant Sheehy, and the men in it were proud too.” Pyle carefully clarified that
the soldiers had no desire to fight because “the old-timers were sick to death of battle, and the
new replacements were scared to death of it.” An important component of the unit’s high morale,
he noted, was that even though they were scared and did not want to be in combat, “the company
went on into battle, and it was a proud company.”24 The “pervasive belief” was that “the best
way to end the war was to end it as quickly as possible with a minimum of casualties while
inflicting maximum damage on the enemy.”25 Pyle’s dispatch demonstrates that this company,
having been put in a position to help end the war, were going to do their best to do so in order to
maintain their own personal pride and the prestige of their company. No other company was
going to be able to say that their company had failed to do their part to end the war. Thus, their
pride became the foundation for their high morale which was critical to maintaining their combat
effectiveness as a unit. Had this company not had pride in itself and its important contribution to
the war effort, fear might have gained control over the GIs and destroyed unit cohesion which
would have significantly reduced combat effectiveness.
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When Captain Charles B. MacDonald led his infantry company into the frontlines for the
first time at the beginning of October 1944, he too detected the effect pride had on both himself
and his company. He recalled, “I was thoroughly imbued with the spirit common among all
infantrymen that ‘my outfit is the best damned outfit in the whole damned Army.’ It could boast
of a record to prove it.”26He continued to note that “I had admired the unglamorous infantry
before, but as the rain continued to fall and the night grew colder my pride at being part of this
dirty, miserable infantry knew no bounds.”27 MacDonald’s baptism by fire occurred during tough
fighting on the German defensive position called the Siegfried Line and in the following months,
his memoir demonstrates how, when lacking in materiel support and operating beyond expected
levels of human endurance, his company was still able to perform effectively in combat.28
Undoubtedly, a portion of this success can be attributed to the intangible pride in their outfit that
MacDonald’s company of soldiers was able to draw on for strength in the direst of situations.
Pride is interesting because it was often an indication that a unit that had high morale. Also
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though, the collective pride of the outfit is what supported individual soldiers’ morale and this
helped MacDonald’s company achieve success on the Siegfried Line. Finally, that battlefield
success further increased the unit’s pride in its achievements and made it more effective in future
combat operations. Pride, being an intangible influence on morale, was difficult to influence and
while the Army encouraged soldiers to take pride in their outfits, it often took exposure to tough,
brutal combat for soldiers to really take pride in their units and be proud of its accomplishments.
Whether a combat unit received credit for its actions could also have a serious effect on
that unit’s morale. Receiving credit depended in part on public perception, an area where the
Army failed miserably for ground combat units in general and the infantry specifically, even
though these units did most of the fighting in Europe. The Army’s Research Branch concluded
that the Army “did not succeed in giving to the Infantry the kind of status which the Marine
Corps has achieved through its publicity campaign.”29 This lack of recognition was particularly
insulting to infantrymen fighting in Europe because the Marine Corps was primarily made up of
infantry soldiers doing the same job as infantrymen in the Army, just in a different location,
under a different organization, yet the Marines received significantly more press coverage for
their accomplishments in combat. The infantry and other ground combat units also struggled to
compete with the inherent romance and glory attributed to the Army Air Corps, whose newness
and advanced technology made it extremely popular with civilians on the home front.30
Eventually the Army realized that this was not only unfair to the frontline Army infantry,
but it was also hurting their morale since they were not being credited with helping win the war
like the Air Corps and Marines were. In order to counteract this, the Army “initiated a systematic
program to raise the prestige of the Infantry.” As part of this program, Congress increased
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infantry pay (an action Pyle strongly advocated), a “large-scale publicity campaign” was
launched, and two special awards were created exclusively for the infantry. They were the Expert
Infantryman’s Badge (EIB) and the Combat Infantryman’s Badge (CIB).31 Of these new awards,
the CIB was very well received since it could only be awarded to infantrymen who had served on
the frontlines and consequently it became the mark of a true combat veteran. This was one way
the Army did well in helping to improve the morale of infantrymen throughout the Army by
grant credit upon them through an official award.
The Army was wise to heed Pyle’s recommendations as part of their program. This was
not only because he was widely respected as a spokesman for frontline GIs, but also because as
Fussell explains, “It was the main concern of Ernie Pyle to confer credit upon the humble and the
normally overlooked,” which were the infantry and other ground combat units. “Gen. Omar
Bradley once said, ‘My men always fought better when Ernie was around.’ And the truth was
that most servicemen would rather have this names appear in one of Pyle’s dispatches than a
medal unless the award of the medal was very widely publicized.”32 Accordingly, these
appraisals by Bradley and Fussell keep with the assessment that soldiers’ morale improved
through credit gained by publicity and the issuance of the CIB which universally represented the
combat service of the wearer.
Pyle demonstrated his effectiveness at giving credit where credit was really due as he
demonstrated with this dispatch that publicized the actions and contributions of the 9th Infantry
Division while it was fighting in the Mediterranean:
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For some reason which we have never fathomed the Ninth wasn’t released
through censorship as early as it should have been, while other divisions were. As
a result, the division got a complex that it was being slighted. They fought hard,
took heavy casualties, and did a fine job generally, but nobody back home knew
anything about it. Lack of recognition definitely affects morale. Every
commanding general is aware that publicity for his unit is a factor in morale. Not
publicity in the manufactured sense, but a public report to the folks back home on
what an outfit endures and what it accomplishes. The average dogfoot will go
through his share of hell a lot more willingly if he knows that he is getting some
credit for it and that the folks back home know about it.33
Pyle summed up the sentiment about receiving credit perfectly in this dispatch and more
importantly conveyed this feeling to the home front so they were aware that their recognition of
the contribution and sacrifices made by frontline GIs was important to their morale. Combat
soldiers were not fighting for glory, but for survival. As they did so, however, they were helping
to win the war and a little acknowledgement of their suffering went a long way towards
sustaining them in combat. Thus, when the Army or commanders were able to produce some
publicity for frontline units or recognize them for their actions in combat, morale improved.
While recognition did not make closing with and destroying the enemy any less difficult or
dangerous, the resultant higher morale certainly helped soldiers through it.
In addition to pride and credit, camaraderie among combat soldiers played an important
part in supporting unit and individual morale. World War II combat was a distinct experience
from previous wars in that very small groups of men spent long periods of time together, isolated
from the outside world. They were also engaged in exceedingly dangerous modern combat which
required these small groups to fight outside the direct observation and control of their leadership.
Consequently, the men in these small groups had to rely on each other to survive combat. It was
this shared experience that led Pyle to write, “the ties that grow between men who live savagely
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together, relentlessly communicating with Death, are ties of great strength.”34 That strength was
something that did not need to be supplied by the Army, nor could it breakdown mechanically,
so when in the most dire situations, combat soldiers placed great value on being able to trust their
comrades and draw strength from them.
Camaraderie also provided a familial sense of comfort that was lacking from soldiers’
lives due to long deployments away from families and in foreign countries. These strong bonds
often led men to make decisions for the benefit of their comrades, even at their own personal
expense. Take the actions of Sergeant Frank “Buck” Eversole for example. One evening when
his company was about to make an attack, Buck received the rare chance to go to a rest area for
five days. His first reaction, however, was to turn down the opportunity in order to lead his squad
during the attack. While his lieutenant told him to go to the rest camp, Buck was so duty-bound
to his comrades that he admitted he felt “like a deserter” even after he was ordered to the rest
camp. Pyle described this seemingly illogical phenomenon as a “powerful fraternalism in this
ghastly brotherhood of war.”35
This camaraderie among soldiers in ground combat units could have negative effects on
soldiers’ morale too though. When casualties were high in frontline units, as they often were, the
camaraderie among soldiers tended to suffer. This was because the “old originals,” the men who
had been with the unit when it first entered combat would grow closer together as there were
fewer and fewer of them left unwounded in a unit, “sometimes no more than a dozen in an
infantry company” which would have started with almost 200 men.36 Meanwhile, new
replacement soldiers would be brought in to take the place of soldiers who had been wounded.
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“Unquestionably on the bottom rung of the social ladder were the latest replacements, who
arrived friendless and forlorn and stayed that way until the other men decided to accept them.”37
It was often difficult for these “new” and “old” men to develop a close camaraderie because the
“old” soldiers were hesitant to make new friends. Gene Garrison of the 87th Infantry Division
explained the reasoning behind this after his machine-gun squad received replacements. “I
recognized that a machine-gun crew working in such proximity would lead to friendships. I had
lost enough friends.”38 This fear of losing even more close friends what inhibited the quick
establishment of camaraderie between veterans and replacements.
On top of this fear of pain from loss, the “new” and “old” had little in common since the
“old originals” had been together for so long and had experienced the trials of combat together.
Not until the “new” replacements spent time in combat would they form strong bonds with the
“old” men and be assimilated into that group. Many new replacements, however, had little
opportunity to assimilate because they often quickly became casualties due to their inexperience.
In one typical example, a squad leader in the 318th Infantry Regiment noted in a War Department
Observers Board report that “new men have a very bad habit of bunching together in their first
battles. This draws direct artillery and mortar fire.”39 This sort of action was a result of
inexperience and abbreviated training, and it led to very high casualty rates among replacements.
“Often more than half became casualties within the first three days on the line.” (See Appendix
A for Casualty Charts).40
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The Army’s replacement system was extremely detrimental to the building of
camaraderie in frontline units. The policy was to fill vacancies left by casualties on an individual
basis rather than as full units or even as small groups of men who knew each other from training
and had already developed some camaraderie. While this was an easier system statistically and
logistically, it was terrible for both the replacement and for the unit receiving replacements. 41
Receiving individual replacement soldiers presented a challenge because they had to be
integrated into the unit while it was engaged in combat which was nearly impossible to do
effectively. As a replacement, Sergeant Gantter had to wait to join his new unit since they were
in the middle of an attack when he and many other individual replacements arrived. He
remembers that “we were so green and there were so many of us [replacements] that we’d be
more hindrance than help to the seasoned veterans on the line.”42 The replacement system failed
to provide any time for camaraderie or unit cohesion to develop either among the replacements
or between the replacements and the “old” men. Officers like 1st Lieutenant Harry Bechel of the
318th Infantry Regiment recognized that making “the replacements feel they are part of the
platoon as much as the old men” was critical to the unit’s morale and success, but officers could
only focus on this goal when the battlefield situation allowed and this seldom happened.43
Replacements were thrown into a situation that was terrifying and that they knew very
little about. One replacement described the experience as “just like being an orphan. You are
away from anybody you know and feel lost and lonesome.”44 This was true both in the
replacement depots where new replacements waited to be assigned to a unit and in the middle of
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the battlefield once they were with their outfit.45 Replacements were often wounded or killed
within just days or even hours of arriving at the front because there was no way to immediately
train them on how to survive on the line. They were assigned positions on the line right away
because of the desperate need for manpower.
The replacement system probably contributed to higher casualty rates because of the
vulnerable position the replacements were in, nevertheless this was the policy maintained by the
Army throughout the war. Small unit leaders recognized the faults of this system and tried their
best to integrate replacements into their unit as quickly as possible in order to preserve unit
cohesion, improve morale and sustain combat effectiveness, but this was not always feasible
under combat conditions. Despite leaders’ efforts, everyone suffered under this system from the
replacements to the veteran soldiers who had to shoulder the bulk of the fighting to the leaders
like this sergeant described by Pyle who became demoralized after trying to take care of the new
replacements he was assigned. The sergeant fell into despair because they were killed so often
that he finally said to his captain, “I’ve got so I feel like it’s me killin’ ‘em instead of a German.
I’ve got so I feel like a murderer. I hate to look at them when the new ones come in.”46 This
feeling of responsibility for young men’s deaths quickly took a toll on leaders’ morale levels and
affected their combat effectiveness. Even though it severely affected soldier and unit morale very
negatively, the Army maintained the same replacement policy for the rest of the war.
The influences of pride, receiving credit and camaraderie had significant impacts on
combat GIs’ morale levels during the campaigns in the ETO. Unfortunately it was likely that
morale would be degraded through insufficient pride in one’s unit, a lack of credit being awarded
to combat soldiers for their substantial sacrifices and contributions towards winning the war or
45
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an absence of camaraderie due to the high casualty rates and perpetuated by the replacement
system. The Army attempted to increase pride and confer credit on an individual level through
the CIB and on the unit level via a publicity campaign. GIs still found these measures lacking,
but, the CIB and publicity campaign eventually increased slightly the pride infantry soldiers had
in their branch. Combat soldiers’ pride in their unit also increased as they achieved difficult
objectives and won victories across Europe.47 Finally, despite the high casualty rates and a faulty
replacement system, GIs continued to form strong bonds over their shared experiences on the
battlefield.
The Necessities of Combat
The phrase, “the life of a combat soldier” creates too inaccurate a picture of the situation
a combat soldier actually found themselves in. It was much more of an existence than a life.
Sergeant Gantter thought that if he cracked (became a combat exhaustion casualty) it would “be
from sheer physical discomfort, from too much mud and snow and water.”48 Every day was a
fight for survival, and too often it was not only the enemy that soldiers had to fight. In contrast to
more emotional influences on morale like pride, receiving credit and camaraderie were a
soldier’s physical needs on the battlefield and often it was a struggle to fulfill the most basic of
life’s necessities. This task was hard enough under combat conditions, but the difficulty was
often increased by the challenges imposed by the weather of Northwest Europe. From the very
beginning, stormy weather threatened the success of the Normandy invasion, thereby
complicating the logistical situation through the destruction of key ports in addition to the
German tactic of sabotaging port facilities before the Allies could capture them. This problem
precipitated a trickle-down effect to the frontline soldiers and the supply problems resulting from
47
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inadequate port facilities would plague the ETO for months to come. In another example of the
weather hindering operations, prolonged rain and military traffic produced operation stalling
mud in the Hurtgen Forest during the fall of 1944. Then again during the Battle of the Bulge, a
combination of snowstorms and extreme low temperatures jeopardized the entire Allied
defensive front, which in turn meant miserable fighting conditions for the soldiers and an even
more dangerous and precarious tactical situation than normal. So it must be kept in mind that
logistical problems in the ETO were constantly complicated not only by enemy actions, but by
difficult weather conditions as well.
While the weather served to compound problems, create headaches and generally lower
morale, there was little anyone could do to fix the weather. In the meantime, there were a host of
problems, accentuated by the weather that could have been corrected if the Army had taken a
different approach. The acquisition of the necessities of life like food, shelter and clothing were
all problematic for the combat soldier, but as Sergeant Gantter recalls “soldiers…are concerned
with five things only. Three of them are physical: food, sleep and shelter.”49 Since GIs’ existence
was generally focused on these smaller things, they’re availability or lack thereof had a
substantial impact on his morale level.
Food was a daily fixation and “a major topic of conversation” for combat soldiers.50 As
Napoleon once said, “an army marches on its stomach” and this remained true in World War II.
Combat and living on the frontlines, required a huge volume of physical exertion which in turn
necessitated large amounts of energy. The US Army during World War II had an international
reputation of being well-fed in comparison to other belligerents. This reputation was in most
cases well deserved. America generally fed its soldiers well throughout the war. That being said,
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the combat soldier rarely had the same experience the rest of the Army had during their service
in the US or behind the frontlines.
The problem of feeding the combat soldier was the inability either to prepare meals on
the frontlines or transport meals from kitchens in the rear to the soldiers on the frontlines.
Combat conditions and the requirement for combat soldiers to almost continually man their
positions on the frontline (usually just foxholes) severely restricted their access fresh, hot food
and the huge morale boost it provided. Instead, combat soldiers had to make do with
prepackaged rations, often eaten cold.51 These meals were monotonous, the quality was only fair
and the quantity not enough. So while the GI used up large amount of energy in combat and
trying to survive the elements, his rations did not adequately sustain him.52 For this very reason,
the combat soldier was always on the lookout for ways to improve his food supply. This often
meant requisitioning civilian food stuffs he came across during battle or trading with local
civilians when the situation allowed. In just one example of this, Gene Garrison recalls a time
when he and his buddies were so focused on the fresh cup of milk a farmer had just given them
(it was the first fresh milk they had had since being in the US), that they failed to notice when the
battalion commander showed up at their position.53 This simple cup of milk boosted the squad’s
morale after a day of intense combat in poor weather conditions, but it was just a drop in a
mostly empty bucket.
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The deficiency of satisfying or even adequate rations severely hampered morale in
frontline units. Soldiers tired quickly of the monotony of the cold prepackaged rations. 54 Captain
MacDonald remembers it was a special event when one day on the Siegfried Line, his company
received steak sandwiches that even cold “tasted like food for a king.”55 A hot meal always
boosted morale and was often all that was need to lift the men’s spirits. Through dedication and
hard work the cooks of the ETO were able to achieve the impressive feat of providing
MacDonald, and all the other troops in the ETO, a turkey dinner on Thanksgiving Day in 1944.56
He was lucky though because his was hot and most got to the frontlines cold. Had this occurred
with any semblance of frequency or regularity the positive consequences for morale levels could
have been dramatic. Establishing a theater-wide solution which ensured combat soldiers could
receive hot meals with some regularity would have been one way for the Army to greatly
improve morale in its combat units. As Pyle eloquently put it, “just one warm meal a day would
have meant a great deal.”57Yet this was rarely the case in the ETO and damaged soldiers’ morale
on a daily basis.
The GI was relatively well clothed by 1944 for the summer campaign in France, but once
the weather turned, “the infantryman’s clothing was woefully, even criminally inadequate.”58
With the onset of a cold and rainy fall, the demand for warm winter clothing spiked.
Unfortunately for the combat soldier, “in the Fall of 1944, there was a winter uniform supply
crisis brought on by squabbling between the Army Quartermaster, War Production Board, and
the officers in the ETO, notably [Generals] Eisenhower and Bradley… This led to production
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and procurement delays throughout 1944 resulting in a severe shortage” of adequate winter
clothing.59 The combat soldier suffered severely for this throughout the winter of 1944-45, which
ended up being one of the coldest on record. So in addition to inadequate rations, combat soldiers
had to deal with the additional stress of never being warm because they lacked proper clothing.
This problem was especially acute during the Battle of the Bulge when a German
offensive and breakthrough necessitated all focus be placed on stabilizing the strategic situation,
leaving clothing resupply as a low priority.60 The Army again failed to support combat soldiers’
morale by issuing them adequate winter clothing and small unit leaders were powerless to
influence strategic logistical decisions that produced this situation. The Army’s decisions
lowered soldiers’ morale by forcing them to endure sub-freezing winter weather in this
inadequate clothing. Instead soldiers like Sergeant Gantter wore whatever they could get their
hands on. He recalls wearing “from the bottom up: overshoes (at last!), shoes, double sole
woolen socks, woolen drawers and undershirt, wool shirt and trousers, sweater, scarf, field
jacket, overcoat, gloves wool-knit cap, the towel snood I described to you, helmet liner and steel
helmet.”61 Combat soldiers like Gantter spent as much time fighting the weather as he did the
Germans and many non-battle casualties like hypothermia, frostbite and trench foot were
sustained because of this.
The environment that combat soldiers, especially infantrymen, were forced to live in, was
particularly draining on their morale. If not actively engaged in combat, combat soldiers spent
most of their time in foxholes (Figure 4). This included nights when the temperature dropped
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below freezing and days when it had been raining for a week straight. “Under enemy fire,
mobility may literally be reduced to zero, as when a soldier is pinned in his foxhole for hours or
days” at a time. Many soldiers testified “that the severest fear producing situation they
encountered in combat was just such immobilization under artillery or mortar fire.”62 This simple
hole in the ground protected them from enemy fire, but was a miserable way to live. Gene
Garrison had a traumatic experience sleeping in a foxhole one night. When he tried to get out of
the hole the next morning, he realized he could not move. In his words: “The shelter half over the
bottom of the hole was submerged in freezing cold water, which covered I had no feeling in my
right arm, and none in my right leg. I felt numb all over. I struggled frantically to get up.”63
Eventually Garrison regained feeling in his right side, but this was not an uncommon experience
for GIs at all and its repetition day after day quickly eroded soldiers’ morale.
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Figure 4: Foxholes

Left: GIs of the US 1st Army in their foxholes near the German border,
November 1944. Source: www.ww2talk.com.
Right: GIs man a foxhole in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge, December
1944. Source: www.ww2throughthelens.blogspot.com.
A GI was lucky if he was able to spend the night in a bombed out house and considered
himself a king anytime he was fortunate enough to have four walls around him and a roof over
his head. Spending weeks on end in foxholes took a terrible toll on soldiers’ bodies. They were
often sick and trench foot became an epidemic problem during the fall and winter. According to
Ambrose, “during the winter of 1944-45, some 45,000 men” were evacuated due to trench foot
and many more suffered but remained on the line.64 Even when GIs were suffering from these
ailments though, leaders often had no choice, but to keep these men in the line. They did not do
this out of cruelty, but rather because they were always “so damned short of men.”65 Leaders
needed everyman they could get their hands on to accomplish their missions or just to hold the
line against German attacks (the success of which would only produce more casualties). On top
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of that, sending the sick or those suffering from trench foot or frostbite back to an aid station
only placed more strain on the few men that would be left thereby increasing their suffering and
causing their morale levels to drop even further. It was an impossible situation for small unit
leaders to say the least. No matter what they did, morale and the soldiers suffered physically,
mentally and emotionally. The Army, for all of its power and authority, offered no solution to
this problem of constant exposure to the elements so the GIs morale suffered and while they
continued to rely on their foxholes throughout the ETO campaign.
Not surprisingly, hygiene standards also suffered in the primitive conditions of the
frontlines. Soldiers commonly defecated (digestion problems were all too common due to the
poor food quality) in their foxholes in order to avoid enemy small arms and artillery fire. In some
exposed positions any movement out of one’s foxhole would draw an enemy barrage. It was safe
to stay in one’s hole than to risk moving out of it to a latrine (if there was one). Soldiers were
also expected to shave every day, but this regulation went out the window in combat. Soldiers
rarely had the opportunity to shave while on the line due to shortages of water and their primitive
living conditions. In a common example, after being on the line for a week, Captain MacDonald
finally had the time and a place to shave. At this point he also “for the first time in four days” got
the chance to wash his hands and face.66 Even worse though was that Capain. MacDonald once
went two and a half months without bathing, except the occasional sponge bath from his
helmet.67 Going this long without bathing was the norm rather than the exception for combat
soldiers as Army sergeant turned cartoonist Bill Mauldin often referenced in his famous “Willie
and Joe” cartoon series which followed two rough and dirty veteran combat infantry men
through their experiences during the war. Combat certainly made the maintenance of living
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standards difficult and in some cases understandably impossible, but the Army did not make
adequate adjustments to its practices to ensure even a most basic standard of living in which
combat soldiers could remain healthy. The conditions combat soldiers were forced to exist in
exacerbated the significant stress of combat and when combined together, quickly lowered a
soldier’s morale thereby making it much more difficult for him to remain motivated and continue
to do his job.
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Figure 5: “Willie and Joe” Cartoons on Frontline Hygiene

Left: “No thanks, Willie. I’ll go look for some mud wot ain’t been used.”
Right: “Drink it all boys---th’ guy wot put out the order about shavin’ain’t
comin’ up here to inspect us.”
Source: Bill Mauldin, Willie & Joe: The WWII Years, Edited by Todd DePastino (Seattle:
Fantagraphics Books, 2008), 68 and 142.

Soldiers under the constant strain of combat, who had had their morale quickly eroded by
a wide variety of factors often found it necessary to find some manner of stress relief. Many GIs,
being young men and knowing they could be killed in combat any day, utilized cigarettes and
alcohol for this purpose. Combat soldiers placed great value on having access to cigarettes and in
this case the Army did an outstanding job of meeting the demand. The Army issued cigarettes
liberally to soldiers, usually at the rate of a pack a day plus the cigarettes that came in the
prepackaged rations and any that were handed out to them by the Red Cross, USO and Army rest
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centers.68 Soldiers who landed in France on D-Day were issued two cartons of cigarettes to
ensure there would be no shortages in the beachhead during the initial stages of the landings
when resupply opportunities were limited. “Observers who visited the beach later said the shore
line was littered with cartons as far as the eye could see.”69 Many if not most combat soldiers
made good use of all of these sources for cigarettes. Pyle related this anecdote in one of his
dispatches:
Murph [Charles J. Murphy] never smoked cigarettes until he landed in
France on D-day, but after that he smoked one after another. He was about the
tenth soldier who had told me that same thing. A guy in war has to have some
outlets for his nerves, and I guess smoking is as good as anything.70
As Pyle reasons, smoking was a reasonable stress reliever for combat soldiers and they certainly
took advantage of it. A cigarette at just the right time could calm and steady a soldier and could
do wonders for his morale. While rarely a problem, when soldiers could not get what they
deemed were enough cigarettes, that was cause for serious griping and this situation had the
reverse effect of harming soldier’s morale, for he did not appreciate being deprived of something
he felt he deserved and was entitled to.71 On the whole though, the Army supported GIs’ morale
through its liberal issuance of cigarettes.
Unlike many other armies of the time, the US Army did not provide an alcohol ration to
its soldiers in combat.72 This, however, did not stop soldiers from acquiring alcohol by other
means. There was plenty of alcohol to be found in the villages and cities of Europe and combat
weary GIs became experts at procuring something to drink whenever they had the chance. While
the consumption of alcohol by frontline soldiers was a grey area, their officers and NCOs often
68
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looked the other way as long as a soldier’s performance did not suffer. Leaders understood the
wonders a drink could do for a soldier’s morale when they were under the immense strain of
daily combat. While by no means a healthy or medically approved stress management technique,
smoking and drinking certainly worked in the short term and helped soldiers to keep going just a
little bit longer. The temporary relaxation a soldier found with a drink was a boost to his morale
and played a large role in the experience and morale maintenance of a combat soldier.
Figure 6:“Willie and Joe” Cartoons on GIs and Alcohol

Left: “Nein, nein—go ahead! I vould not think of interfering.”
Right: “Them rats. Them dirty, cold-blooded, soreheaded, stinkin’ Huns.
Them atrocity committin’ skunks!”
Source: Bill Mauldin, Willie & Joe: The WWII Years, Edited by Todd DePastino (Seattle:
Fantagraphics Books, 2008), 74 and 261.

37
All of the subjects covered in this section are small details on their own, but when a GI
had to deal with cold rations, inadequate clothing, exposure to the elements and sickness on top
of the stress and fear induced by combat, one can see how together they quickly eroded morale.
The GI was part of “the best-dressed, best-fed, best equipped army in the world,” but analysis of
combat veterans’ experiences clearly demonstrates that this was still not enough to provide the
basic necessities of life to many frontline soldiers.73 This lack of adequate support by the Army
exposed soldiers to needless hardships, was responsible for additional casualties and constantly
degraded soldiers’ morale while they were engaged in combat.
Tactical Concerns
Most combat in World War II occurred at the company level and below.
Correspondingly, the world of the combat soldier was limited to this small scale. At this level,
the daily focus of soldiers was on the immediate tactical situation. Rare was the combat soldier
who had time to worry about the overall strategic situation. The combat soldier’s attention was
focused on the events happening immediately around him as those were the ones that impacted
his existence. These short-term, immediate concerns are referred to as the tactical situation. For
the GI, the difference boiled down to, for example, why he cared about who his platoon leader
was and not about who commanded his division. The division commander was simply too far
removed from the individual soldier’s daily existence to have been relevant. The platoon leader
on the other hand interacted with his soldiers daily and directly controlled all of their actions.
Some of the major tactical concerns that were relevant to combat soldiers’ including quality of
leadership, the nature and effect of casualties, the quality and effectiveness of soldiers’ combat
training, and the outcome of combat engagements.
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The importance of good leadership in combat cannot be overstated. The Army depended
on small unit leaders to accomplish missions and they were expected to do so while looking out
for the welfare of their soldiers. Often though, these two objectives were at extreme odds in
combat and it was up to small unit leaders to strike the most appropriate balance possible.
Morale came into play because if a leader could not strike a balance he was perceived as
ineffective and soldiers lacked confidence in him. This led to low combat effectiveness and
could have deadly consequences for a combat unit.
The Army maintained a complex program for the acquisition and training of officers
throughout the war, but the effectiveness of the Army’s approach was questionable at best.
Initially, the ground combat arms branches and particularly the Infantry, got the lowest quality
officer recruits because those with special skills or more education were deemed critical and
assigned to “technical” branches like the Air Corps. Thus, according to the Army, the Infantry
did not require highly qualified officers, but nothing could have been further from the reality on
the frontlines. Leading ground combat troops on the World War II battlefield was probably the
most challenging job in the war, but the Army did not acknowledge this.
On top of the low quality baseline, casualties among junior officers were extremely high
in the ETO. “Casualties among second lieutenants were in some cases as high or higher than
among riflemen in the line. It was not unusual to find a rifle company which after two or three
months in combat had none of its original officers remaining in the unit.”74 Figure 7 shows the
number of replacement officers sent to the ETO by month and what portion of those went to the
infantry. In all but three months from June 1944 to April 1945, at least one-half of all
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replacement officers went to the ETO which is another testament to the high casualty rates.75 Of
those replacement officers, in all but two months, about 60% of them were assigned to the
Infantry.76 These high casualty rates produced a situation where the Army had a chronic shortage
of officer replacements. The In an effort to produce adequate numbers of replacements, training
periods for new officers like Lieutenant George Wilson were shortened to as little as ninety
days.77 When the situation became even more acute the Army briefly retrained already
commissioned officers from the Anti-aircraft branch and transferred them to the infantry as
platoon leaders.78
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Figure 7: Overseas Shipments of AGF Officer Replacements
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The combination of lower quality and undertrained replacement officers of which there
was a severe shortage, meant there was significant absence of quality leadership sent to the
frontlines and the GIs on the frontline were very well aware of this. This system did not inspire
confidence in soldiers and lowered their morale. They were concerned that their leaders were
incompetent and would not get them killed due to lack of training and inexperience. Lieutenant
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George Wilson, of the 4th Infantry Division, had to deal with these retread officers as an infantry
company commander.80 He recalled one attack through some woods on the Siegfried Line in
November of 1944 when a replacement officer failed to keep his platoon advancing when they
suspected a German tank was moving to their front. The platoon panicked and began to retreat,
threatening the entire battalion’s assault. The “tank” turned out to be a fallen tree trunk and the
lieutenant was killed less than an hour later. It was his first day on the frontline.81 This is not to
say that all officers assigned to combat units were inferior to their peers because as demonstrated
by the great success of ground combat units in the ETO there were many incredibly talented and
dedicated officers in combat units. Rather officers often did not score well in the Army’s
assessment system and thus by the Army’s own metric of evaluation were of lower than desired
quality.82 Following from this one sees that the Army did not place a proper emphasis on the
high caliber of officer required to lead combat units that on the surface did not require as many
measurable technical skills.
Often an intense atmosphere of skepticism generally surrounded replacement officers
until they proved their competence under fire. An encounter witnessed by Gene Garrison
between a veteran sergeant and one of these replacement officers probably best expressed
combat veterans’ initial reaction towards new officers. Garrison recalled his comrade saying the
following about a new lieutenant, “‘Goddamned ninety-day wonder,’ the sergeant spat. ‘What
does he know? He wasn’t here.’” 83 Divisiveness like this could have been deadly for both the
GIs and the unit’s morale. A survey conducted by the Research Branch of soldiers in the ETO,
however, found that infantry companies, more so than rear echelon soldiers, felt that their
80
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officers were the kind to share the toughest experiences with them and that their officers took a
personal interest in their well-being. Additionally, “the highest portion of favorable attitudes
[towards officers] tended to be found among combat troops.”84 This can be attributed to the fact
that the distinction between ranks became more blurred the closer to the fighting one got. This is
the same conclusion that was drawn by the Research Branch during the war. In its report on the
subject it noted that:
The fact that combat soldiers had more favorable attitudes than other
towards officers could be attributed in part to the opportunity to discharge their
aggression directly against the enemy. But this would be much too simple a view
of the matter. Among combat troops, whether air or ground, officers and enlisted
men shared the common experiences of deprivation, danger and death. Social
differentiations and special privileges were at a minimum.85
These shared experiences and dangers quickly exposed officers who could not lead men in
combat. This process also created a strong bond based on confidence and mutual respect between
veteran combat officers and enlisted personnel. A unit with these attributes would have had
resilient unit cohesion, high morale and formed an effective team in combat. The challenge was
to build such a team in combat before too many members became casualties and the progression
stalled. Unfortunately, the high casualty rates and poor officer training often led the process to
fail and failure lowered unit morale and combat effectiveness.
Essentially, the foundation of the officer corps in ground combat units was more
questionable than it was in a branch like the Air Corps. This presented yet another needless
obstacle for combat units to overcome in their pursuit of combat effectiveness. Small unit leaders
could do little to rectify this situation either. They had to work with the leaders they had at their
disposal, regardless of the quality, since they were in such short supply. The Army failed its
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ground combat soldiers in this respect by not having the foresight to adequately prepare for or
anticipate the critical importance of junior officers, especially to infantry operations. Welltrained and highly-skilled junior officers, if provided in adequate numbers could have significant
positive impacts on GIs’ morale levels and units combat effectiveness.
Well trained and experienced NCOs were also critical to combat effectiveness and high
unit morale because they were a key part of the leadership structure of small units. NCOs
ensured that the plans developed by officers were properly and skillfully executed and that the
men’s welfare was looked after. They also assumed roles normally filled by officers, like platoon
leader, when there were no officers available to fill these vacancies. The NCOs of combat units,
however, struggled with the same difficulties that faced the officer corps: a lack of qualified
NCOs due to high casualty rates. It was also not easy to replace NCOs since one of their most
important qualifications was combat experience. The Army tried to transfer NCOs into the
infantry from overstaffed branches like Anti-Aircraft and the Army Air Corps, but as Gene
Garrison observed, “there were some ill feelings towards these new men, because they brought
previous rank with them yet had no experience in the infantry.”86
The alternative left to company commanders was to promote soldiers from within the
company, but this was not ideal either. Private Raymond Gantter of the 1st Infantry Divison
found himself the recipient of one of these quick promotions and thrust into an NCO position
once his unit entered combat and the NCOs became casualties. As a result of the high casualty
rates, men like Gantter became NCOs simply because they had survived combat for a few
months or weeks and thus had the most combat experience; something that could not be said for
the incoming replacements.87 Either situation left a unit desperate for experienced NCOs to help
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form the backbone of the company. Without them, unit cohesion, combat effectiveness, the lives
of the men and morale were all at sever risk. Again the Army failed to anticipate the
requirements for strong NCOs and their replacement when casualties were suffered. Like the
shortage of officers, this was severely detrimental not only to operational success, but to soldiers’
well-being.
The situation on the battlefield at any given time and the success or failure of specific
operations was probably one of the more obvious contributors to soldiers’ morale. It is safe to
assume that victory in battle generally correlated with high morale and defeat with low morale,
but on the modern battlefield the outcome is not always immediately clear so closer analysis of
particular strategic situations is required. It is helpful to understand the situations sketched in The
American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath as this work covers the most common scenarios
that existed in the ETO.88 First, the classic rapid advance of the Army generally produced light
casualties and many enemy prisoners. While this type of battle usually included close range
fighting between small units, it “was favorable to high morale and a sense of group cohesion in
carrying out a great achievement.” A second type of operation “was the assault on fortified
positions….Such assaults always carried the threat of especially heavy casualties.” When this
battle had to be executed quickly against “an alert and resolute defending force, the battle called
primarily for a morale which would enable men to press on in an organized team even when
casualties seemed terribly great.” Third and “probably most dreaded by experienced combat
soldiers: the assault on defended beaches or across defended water barriers.” These operations
sustained high casualties and required “cool and aggressive leadership.” Defensive operations
were also conducted in the ETO and could “involve some of the most intensive combat… In
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such situations there might be no hope of respite for indefinite periods.” Retreats and
withdrawals could be psychologically stressful due to the yielding of ground that was hard won.
“The confusion and disorganization of retreat following and enemy breakthrough was certainly
among the most difficult situations a soldier could face.” Finally, the holding action during
which soldiers merely had to man a stable section of frontline. Nevertheless, tedium, the
harassing artillery and mortar fire, and the cumulative effects of poor living and sleeping
conditions made this easiest of all combat conditions no real respite for the combat soldier.” 89
While each of the above strategic situations impacted morale to an extent, all of them
required GIs to be on the frontline under enemy fire. As long as GIs were on the frontline, their
existence was rough and precarious. A GI could be killed just as easily in a holding action as he
could in an assault on a fortified position. After spending some time on the line, most soldiers
believed that it was just a matter of time before they became a casualty. If nothing else, extended
periods of time spent on the frontline wore down GIs physically and mentally. Both this attitude
towards becoming a casualty and the degrading effects of combat on soldiers were very
detrimental to their morale.
With ground combat units engaged in heavy fighting from 1944 to 1945 in the ETO, high
casualty rates were unavoidable. With regards to an individual soldiers’ morale though, it was
not the overall statistics that were important, but rather what happened on the small unit level.
“…because men in combat were closely bound together by mutual dependence and affectional
ties they were correspondingly shaken by the loss of comrades.”90 So not only were periods of
heavy combat stressful by their nature, but their effects were in a sense doubled when soldiers
experienced the loss of their comrades. It was traumatic enough to lose close friends through
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gruesome wounds inflicted by the enemy, but witnessing death all around also increased a
soldier’s sense of mortality. William Foley, of the 94th Infantry Division, experienced this feeling
even before entering actual combat after seeing a dead GI who’s “one limb was black, shriveled,
and footless.” The soldier behind Foley in line “gagged and then vomited against the wall”
meanwhile the rest of the replacements behind him “tried to squeeze past him.” Foley described
this incident as a “graphic introduction” and a “sudden glimpse at the reality of what [they] were
getting into.” 91 This initial realization could be devastating to a soldier’s morale, sometimes
even enough so that soldiers were unable to perform their duties. The only way to counteract
these effects was being taken off the frontline, a topic which will be discussed later on.
The bright spot for morale with regards to casualties were the actions of the combat
medics and the subsequent chain of medical care. Combat medics were revered for their heroism
and commitment to saving the lives of their comrades, often at great personal risk. During
training stateside, the term for these unarmed soldiers was medic or aid man, but as medic Buddy
Gianelloni recalled, in combat he and other medics quickly became referred to affectionately as
“Doc.” At the time Gianelloni, like so many of his fellow medics, was only nineteen years old.92
Historian Stephen Ambrose recalled “On countless occasions, when I’ve asked a veteran during
an interview if he remembered any medics, the old man would say something like. “Bravest man
I ever saw. Let me tell you about him…”93 The security gained from knowing that when a soldier
was wounded, a medic would be there to treat him almost instantly was of supreme value in
motivating soldiers to continually expose themselves to danger in order to complete missions.
The medics assigned to combat units and the medical support structure behind the lines did an
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outstanding job as proved by the fact that “over 85 percent of the soldiers who underwent
emergency operations in a mobile field hospital or evacuation hospital survived.”94 To the
frontline soldier this statistic translated into the sentiment “as one lieutenant put it, “We were
convinced the Army had a regulation against dying in an aid station.”95 This intangible, but very
real sense of security certainly had a subtle, positive effect on soldiers’ morale. The success of
the Medical Department and combat medics in supporting soldiers’ morale was one of the
Army’s great achievements during the war.
The quality of training soldiers received prior to entering combat also affected their
morale, especially when they faced their first test of combat. Much has already been written on
the quality of training, including an entire volume of the Army’s official World War II history
dedicated to the subject.96 Training quality affected soldier morale in two ways. First, it
influenced the confidence level of soldiers entering combat for the first time. Many veterans
detail in their memoirs how they worried how well prepared they were to handle the demands of
combat. Their inexperience led them to question whether or not they would know what to do
once at the front and under fire.97 These feelings were corroborated by surveys (shown in Figure
8, “Self-Confidence in Infantry Companies”) conducted by the Research Branch that indicated
less than one-third of soldiers felt they had received enough training and were ready for combat
just prior to the D-Day landings on June 6, 1944 .98 Quality of training was a particular problem
for replacements because they “had probably had briefer training than men who had trained with
their combat division.” Post-combat evaluations conducted by the Research Branch in August
1944 support this since replacements who survived to become veterans self-reported higher
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incidents of potentially deadly mistakes they made in combat which points to their lower quality
of training as the problem. 99 Finally, the Research Branch acknowledged that there was a
possible correlation between lack of training and low morale in that it stated “that fear reactions
in combat may be due, in part, to an attitudinal factor—the feeling that one has not had sufficient
training for one’s combat job.”100 Clearly soldiers who lacked “adequate preparation,” suffered
from lower morale from the start because it increased their chances of becoming a casualty.101
Unfortunately, there was nothing small unit leaders could do to rectify this problem except give
crash courses in battlefield survival and on the job training whenever possible in an effort to help
replacements survive. The task of adequate training fell to the Army and forced to decide
between a shortage of bodies in combat outfits and sending undertrained soldiers into combat, it
chose the latter, but men died and morale suffered because of it.
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Figure 8: Self-Confidence in Infantry Companies
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The second effect of training quality was the concern of combat veterans that the
replacements they received were inadequately trained for the tasks demanded of them by combat.
These concerns were well documented by combat veterans in reports submitted to higher
headquarters. In general, they criticize the lack of realistic battle and directly applicable training
given to replacements. Veterans of all ranks observed that replacements should be exposed to
more live fire drills to get them accustomed to the combat experience as early as possible. They
also recommend more practical weapons training with both personal and crew served weapons. It
was noted that replacements often did not have the necessary skills to properly employ machine
guns and bazookas, nor were they skilled in using their personal rifles in circumstances other
than the rifle range. These failures of training presented serious problems when replacements
were thrown into a unit just before or as it was engaged in an action. With no way to test the
replacements, the veterans of a unit had to trust that the replacements were capable of doing their
jobs and watching their backs. Unfortunately, with the deteriorated quality of training, this was
not often the case. The lack of confidence promoted by this situation hampered the morale of the
veterans because they could not trust the replacements the Army was sending them with their
lives. Essentially, they could not trust the Army to provide them with the qualified personnel
necessary not only to win battles, but to ensure their own personal survival through the mutual
protect one expects in a combat unit. 103
“It was not the job of the front-line machine gunner or tanker to train replacements. The
Army was supposed to do that and it failed.”104 This failure caused combat soldiers’ morale to
suffer and as a consequence so did their performance. Even in 1944 and 1945, after the Army
had seen the results of its training program firsthand on battlefields around the world,
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replacement soldiers arriving in the ETO still required additional training if they were to have a
chance at survival. Some divisions established official training centers for the replacements they
received, but often this task fell to small unit leaders to try and train their replacements during
brief lulls in combat and short rest periods.105 Frequently, the best that could be done was a few
words of advice from a squad leader the first night a replacement arrived on the line and then
hope he survived the until the next morning when a little bit more knowledge could be imparted.
Repeating this process and a lot of luck would in theory lead to a replacements survival and thus
entrance into the ranks of the combat veteran.
No Escape from the Frontlines
Possibly the most significant demoralizing aspect of the combat soldier’s experience was
the realization that occurred after just a short time in the line: that there was no way to escape the
horrors of the frontline. Throughout the war the ground combat soldier was subject to an Army
system that essentially condemned them to three possible fates: to be killed, to be wounded, or to
become a combat exhaustion casualty. The only escape from these outcomes was the end of the
war. There was also little opportunity for any real rest once a soldier entered combat. Once a
division was committed to combat that division essentially remained on the line until the end of
the war. This subjected combat soldiers to day after day of exposure to the brutal conditions of
combat. Fussell, describes what this constant combat will do to a soldier:
Inevitably, all will break down if in combat long enough. “Long enough” is now
defined by physicians and psychiatrists as between 200 and 240 days. As medical
observers have reported, “there is no such thing as ‘getting used to combat’…Each
moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to
the intensity and duration of their experience.”106
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While veteran combat soldiers understood that there was only so much stress and demoralization
a man could take, the Army learned this officially in a study conducted by the Research Branch,
published in April 1945. Table 4 shows how every soldier peaked in their effectiveness after a
certain amount of time in combat and after that peak began a steady decline towards combat
exhaustion.
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Figure 9: Quality of GIs by Time in Combat107

The Army also maintained a policy through which few soldiers were ever rotated home
for a furlough even though many spent years overseas.108 This prevented combat soldiers from
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being able to look forward to a certain, measurable point at which they would officially have
fulfilled their service obligation and had earned a break. This made soldiers quite bitter because
the Air Corps, considered a much less dangerous and more pleasant branch by ground combat
soldiers, in fact had a rotation policy in place where after a certain number of missions airmen
were rotated back to the US. Captain MacDonald’s unit, had one experience with a rotation
policy for the infantry in which four men were selected for a ninety-day furlough to the US.
“Most men who took the time to figure, however, found that unless drastic changes in the system
took place, it would be 1999 before they would see the States again—barring serious wounds,
the only salvation.”109 That calculation alone was enough to degrade any soldier’s morale.
The lack of an effective rotation policy added to the soldiers’ need for periods of rest off
the frontline. While these did occur, they were too irregular and too infrequent to counteract the
long periods of combat soldiers were often subjected to. Then if a soldier’s unit was pulled out of
the line, it was often given additional tasks that prevented the men from getting the rest the
desperately needed. This placed a severe strain on the soldiers’ morale. The lack of a rotation
policy and inadequate rest meant that once a soldier was assigned to a frontline unit, he would
almost inevitably become a casualty of one sort or another. The odds were heavily stacked
against the combat soldier.
The replacement system was deeply flawed and caused many problems for combat
soldiers. One of these was that it also returned wounded soldiers to their frontline units after they
had recovered and “nearly three soldiers in four were returned to duty” by the medical system
after being wounded.110 After this recovery period, the soldier would either be sent back to his
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unit or to a new combat unit through the replacement system depending on how long his
recovery had taken. Because of this many GIs were wounded multiple times. The problem is that
these same soldiers who had already been worn down by combat had to keep going back until
they were wounded too badly to fight, they were killed or the war ended. Gene Garrison had
several of his friends return to his unit and pick up fighting where they had left off.111All the
while, other soldiers enjoyed safe jobs behind the lines. This fostered even more resentment for
rear-area personnel amongst combat troops who felt slighted yet again. The GI was generally
willing to do his fair share and did not slink away from combat duty, but also resented the
unfairness enforced by this replacement/return-to-duty system.
The realization for a combat soldier that he was only going to escape the frontlines
through the end of the war or becoming a serious casualty seriously affected ones mental wellbeing and morale level. It is difficult to keep going, caring about one’s assigned job, while
waiting to be wounded or killed and meanwhile watching it happen all around you. This is on top
of all of the other stressors, hardships and difficulties one was subjected to on the frontlines.
One’s morale can only last so long under such conditions before a soldier becomes completely
drained. The system emplaced by the Army during World War II, however, forced the soldier
into exactly this deadly situation and left them there. Not enough regard was given to adequate
rest periods, the opportunity for rotation back to the US or a safer job, or to the plight of
replacements being funneled into the frontlines on a daily basis. The Army structure that was
supposed to be behind the soldiers on the frontline actually set these GIs up for failure and even
after the Army had the evidence that this was the case, it continued with the same system despite
the pleas from those at the front who knew that the system had to change and doing so could
prevent much pain, suffering and hardship in the ranks of the combat soldier.
111

Garrison, Unless Victory Comes, 111.

56
What we have seen so far is that morale is an extremely complex issue comprised of
many different attributes including pride, confidence, courage, aggression, dependable
performance, selfless-sacrifice and co-operation. We have also seen that while there were some
bright spots for combat soldiers including unit pride, occasional credit for actions, camaraderie,
medical care, and battlefield success, there were many more factors that collectively eroded
soldiers’ morale from every possible angle, quickly wearing them down. Recall how the
replacement system, high casualty rates, the lack of a rotation policy, sub-standard training, a
lack of proper clothing, inadequate rations, poor hygiene and exposure to the elements served to
erode soldiers’ morale. Too often, combat soldiers who were on the frontlines for far too long
without a break had their morale completely destroyed by their experiences. The result was a
new category of wound: the combat exhaustion casualty.

CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF MORALE

Where the Army failed during World War II was in the prevention of these combat
exhaustion casualties occurring in the first place. This paper has detailed the many on the
difficulties combat soldiers faced when it came to maintaining high morale. While the Army may
have realized the importance of maintaining morale, little was done to prevent combat
exhaustion from occurring. In several cases, the strategies adhered to by the Army, particularly
the replacement system, worked against high morale and undermined the combat soldier instead
of supporting him. In doing this, the Army reduced its soldiers’ morale level and its own combat
effectiveness, thereby possibly prolonging the war. It also unnecessarily increased the burden
placed on the relatively small number of soldiers actually engaged in combat in the ETO.
The condition of combat exhaustion was not entirely new in World War II. It was known
as “shell shock” in WWI and certainly soldiers have always suffered mentally after engaging in
combat. In World War II though, progress was made in identifying and treating the condition.
The first step in treating the wound though was identifying it which the Medical Department
does here:
The army’s chief neuropsychiatrist graphically described the distinctive
symptoms of a combat exhaustion casualty: “Typically he appeared as a dejected,
dirty, weary man. His facial expression was one of depression sometimes of
tearfulness. Frequently his hands were trembling or jerky. Occasionally he would
display varying degrees of confusion, perhaps to the extent of being mute or
staring into space. Very occasionally he might present classically hysterical
symptoms.112
The triggers for this condition were generally of two types. The first was the initial entry into
combat and the shock to one’s system this entailed. The second was prolonged exposure to
112
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frontline combat. This would be the case of the combat veteran breaking after 200-240 days. The
condition presented in a wide variety of ways and its symptoms were often influenced by a
specific, particularly traumatic experience of the soldier.113 Early in the war, the Army was
uncertain about how to handle the condition, but by the invasion of France in 1944, treatment
was part of the planning phase.
In Normandy, there was an entire field hospital dedicated only to treating these casualties
since they required special psychological treatment the rest of the system was not equipped to
handle. This field hospital had more psychiatric assets and provided soldiers with the things they
needed most, a warm bed, food, a chance to get cleaned up and most importantly, rest. Other
techniques, however, were being experimented with throughout the ETO. For example, the 4th
Division established its own rest center for exhaustion cases. They had found that keeping cases
as close to their units as possible helped a great deal, as long as they were safe from any danger,
which they were. Additionally, this solution ensured that recovered cases did not have to
navigate the hellish replacement system and could return directly to their units. This was critical
because the sense of familiarity and security were important to preventing combat exhaustion
and these veterans had already established a place for themselves in their units. By the end of the
war, the Medical Department and combat units in general had a better understanding of how to
treat these combat exhaustion cases demonstrated by the fact that most cases were returned to
duty of some kind after treatment.
True combat exhaustion was not something frowned upon on the frontlines by other
combat veterans. While leaders had the say over who was evacuated as an exhaustion casualty

113

War Department, “Combat Exhaustion,” Official Training Film Misc. 1197 Produced by Army Pictorial
Service, Signal Corps, Army Service Forces, 1945. YouTube video, uploaded December 24, 2009,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2wXF4cG8rQ.

59
and who was not, this did not stop the other men of the unit from passing judgment. In general, if
the man who “broke” was a combat veteran and had a good record with the unit it was accepted
that he had just reached his limit and that was all that could have been asked from him.114 The
common consensus was that everyman had his limit, some could take more than others and a
soldier was expected to take as much as he could, for to fake exhaustion in order to be evacuated
was shameful and hurt every other man who would remain behind.115 Often men would return
after they had had a brief rest, some good food and a hot shower, which is just the type of
treatment Maj. Richard Winters of the 101st Airborne Division advocated for.116 This was seen as
the mark of a good soldier who was loyal to his unit since he returned to them as soon as he was
able to and continued to do his duty. He did not take the opportunity to avoid returning to combat
despite its misery. There were those, however, who tried to fake the condition in order to escape
the frontlines. These men were seen as cowards and lost their comrades respect and trust.117
Good leaders could usually see through this charade and would simply refuse to evacuate the
healthy soldier, like Lieutenant Wilson did in the Hurtgen Forest. 118 A general measuring tool
used was the level of physical incapacitation suffered by the casualty. According to observations
made by the Research Branch while interviewing combat veterans, the general consensus on how
to view these casualties was that “a soldier whose symptoms persisted long after the objective
danged subsided was generally regarded by his fellows as a sick man…The key factor which was
stressed by the interviewees was effort to overcome the withdrawal tendencies engendered by
114
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intense fear [original emphasis].”119 Eventually, the soldier faking exhaustion would have to give
up the act.
While the Army structure as a larger organization failed to support the morale of the
combat soldier in many ways, the same cannot be said for his small unit leaders and comrades.
The tightknit group that formed at the front blurred the officer-enlisted distinction and supported
itself as much as possible. Officers protected their men from the interference of higher echelon
units since they had enough on their hands to begin with and looked the other way when the men
indulged with a bottle of cognac on a sub-zero night. While this camaraderie was essential to
battlefield success and maintenance of unit morale, it was not always enough to preserve the
individual morale of soldiers, resulting in high rates of combat exhaustion. Furthermore, only so
much could be accomplished at the small unit level. A company commander, as much as he
might try, could not change the replacement system used by the Army. His company, he and the
replacements it received were forced to work within the system. Likewise a squad leader could
not send a soldier to a rest center just because he had been in the line for over 200 days and the
squad leader could tell he was nearing his breaking point. In such a situation the squad leader
restricted because there was always another mission to conduct with his likely understrength
squad and voluntarily sending another man away would have increased the workload on those
that remained on the line.120
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Sergeant Gantter “made bitter acquaintance” with this circumstance. He reflected on his time as a
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Over the course of World War II and especially from 1944 to 1945 the Army experienced
many hard lessons on the practical importance of morale and the devastating consequences of its
failure. The great success story is how frontline troops coped with and adapted to the hazards to
high morale on the battlefield in order to persevere and accomplish their missions. To the
frontline soldier though it must have seemed like the Army was often conspiring against its own
troops success. One must also acknowledge, however, the multiplicity of competing interests and
priorities during wartime that often prevented the Army from focusing solely on soldiers’ morale
level. Simultaneously though, it is a tragedy that so many men suffered through an experience
that could have been significantly improved through better forethought and planning and though
being more aware and adaptable to feedback from the battlefield. Some small changes, like
regular hot meals and rest periods, could have significantly improved soldiers’ morale level,
combat effectiveness and overall wartime experience.

GLOSSARY

AGF - Army Ground Forces
ASF - Army Service Forces
CIB - Combat Infantryman’s Badge; World War II “demonstrated the importance of highly
proficient, tough, hard and aggressive infantry, which can be obtained only by developing a high
degree of individual all-around proficiency on the part of every infantryman. As a means of
attaining the high standards desired and to foster esprit de corps in infantry units; the Expert
Infantryman and the Combat Infantryman badges are established for infantry personnel.”121 The
CIB could only be awarded after combat service.
Combat Exhaustion - technically termed just “Exhaustion” by the Medical Dept. in order to
avoid worrying patients; this was the emotional or physical breakdown that soldiers suffered
after having been exposed to a particularly traumatic or prolonged combat experience. It was
eventually recognized and treated by the Medical Department, which found that most patients
recovered after being given a few days of rest, hot food and a chance to clean up.122
Company grade officers - Platoon leaders (lieutenants) and company commanders (captains)
Dogfoot - One of many nicknames for the infantry soldier. Others include: dogface and grunts.
EIB - Expert Infantryman’s Badge; awarded for proficiency as an Infantryman; See also CIB.
ETO - European Theater of Operations; refers to France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg,
Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia and the operations that took place in these areas. Italy,
although part of Europe, was included in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.
GI - a slang term for the average American soldier during World War II, standing for
Government Issue or General Issue, with reference to the contrast that existed between the
former civilians with individuality who became just one of millions of men in the Army during
the mobilization.
Mess - food, chow
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Mortar - a small artillery piece organic to and controlled at the company level that could fire
small shells at a high trajectory up to 1,800 yards
NCO - Noncommissioned Officer (corporals and sergeants)
Platoon leader (PL) - A lieutenant who was responsible for the training, discipline, control, and
tactical employment of his platoon.123
Platoon sergeant (PSG) - a senior sergeant who assisted the platoon leader and served as second
in command of a platoon; generally responsible for supplies and looking after the welfare of the
soldiers
Squad leader (SL) - generally a sergeant or staff sergeant and was “responsible for their
employment, training, and sustenance”124
Trenchfoot - Trenchfoot occurs after prolonged exposure of the feet to wet and cold conditions.
GIs were susceptible because they had inadequate foot ware and lived outside in the elements
with no way to get warm or dry. When a soldier got trench foot, first the man “lost his toenails.
Then his feet turned white, then purple, finally black. A serious case of trenchfoot made walking
impossible. Many men lost their toes, some had to have their feet amputated.”125
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Source: Doubler, Closing With The Enemy, 236-7.
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